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ABSTRACT  
 
We estimate the effect of external financial constraints on fixed investment intentions for 
UK manufacturing by size of firm distinguishing between normal effects and those since the 
financial crisis began in the UK in 2007. Our financial constraints data are constructed to 
reflect only supply-side influences i.e., they are independent of cyclical conditions that may 
affect the demand for credit. Using consistent quarterly long run survey data with IV 
estimation, we find that, only for the crisis period, are financial constraints important for 
large firms and then only for periods of falling business optimism. By contrast, small firms 
experienced continuous constraint but with no additional supply side effect during the crisis. 
A policy implication for the UK is that the key to resumed lending to SMEs may lie, not so 
much with bank behaviour as with the demand conditions that these firms face, in 
particular, the sustainability and certainty of demand.    
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Financial Constraints on Investment: Effects of Firm Size and the Financial Crisis 
 
1 Introduction 
The financial crisis that affected the UK from 2007-8 involved a shock, not only to credit 
supply but also to credit demand. The changed conditions represent an opportunity to study 
the long-debated question about the availability of credit to small and large enterprises and 
in particular the controversy over whether small firms face particular difficulties in accessing 
finance for expansion both in normal times and under conditions of general credit 
constraints that characterise a financial crisis. The latter issue is important for forward-
looking assessment of financial indicators such as firm-level Beta in periods when there is an 
expectation that general credit conditions may worsen. It is also important for policy-
makers seeking to understand whether constraints on capital investment should be 
attributed to credit availability or to other influences. 
 
During the Financial Crisis, UK capital investment fell sharply with a fall of more than a 
quarter between the end of 2007 – when the failure of Northern Rock initiated the first leg 
of the UK crisis - and 2009. The recovery was slow by historical standards and by comparison 
with the US and Germany; six years after the onset of the crisis investment was still more 
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than 12% below pre-crisis levels (Oxford Economics 2013, p.31). Many commentators have 
attributed the slow recovery to the banks’ reluctance to provide finance, especially to small 
and medium firms (SMEs). Other accounts, however, see investment as more constrained by 
real economy issues such as firm-level uncertainty or corporate governance influences 
(Salaheen et al 2017; Driver and Guedes 2017). 
 
Financial constraints are often seen as generated by asymmetric information held by banks, 
one result of which is to disrupt the normal market mechanism of pricing loans by risk. An 
adverse selection effect operates whereby the weight of the most risky borrowers may 
increase with interest rates, thus rendering allocation by rationing more effective (Stiglitz and 
Weiss 1981). The counter narrative of the Keynesian literature sees the possibility of 
financial constraints even in a world of symmetric information with rationing due to the 
endogenous creation of money by commercial banks and the need to curtail credit when 
lending booms end (McLeay et al 2014).  While the asymmetric story tends to focus attention 
on small firms for whom it may be uneconomic to monitor intensively, the financial crisis 
showed that financial constraints operated more broadly and were felt by firms large enough 
to support bond ratings and to be amenable to low cost monitoring. The cross-country study 
of Beck et al (2005) finds support for both these narratives in the period up to 1999; in that 
study,  finance constraints – which are found to affect small firms most - reflect both 
relational variables (paper work, special connections, persuasive collateral) as well as 
macroeconomic drivers such as interest rates and a lack of supply capacity in the banking 
system. 
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The pattern of financial constraints may differ from normal in a financial crisis. Small firms 
will normally have “constrained access to lines of credit” especially when the banking 
system is concentrated as in the UK (Han et al 2015, p.3.).  It is unclear whether this effect is 
intensified in a crisis period.  The UK Financial Conduct Authority has investigated one large 
bank and found there to be systemically poor treatment of small business customers in the 
recovery period following the crisis. But there seems only anecdotal evidence that, in 
general, SME credit constraints “…became acute after the financial crisis in 2008” (Mayer 
2013 p.134). There is some hard evidence of immediate lower credit provision for SMEs in 
the early part of the crisis but it remains unclear whether this was particularly sharp for 
SMEs or indeed to what extent it reflected demand, or supply, influences. Nevertheless, the 
policy response by public agencies was sympathetic to a supply-constrained interpretation 
and, in the 2014 UK Budget, a consultative review was set up to address concerns that the 
top four banks  -  accounting for 80% of lending to SMEs -  were not facilitating enough 
credit (HM Treasury 2014). This report focused on the difficulty of switching between 
financial providers, while remaining (as so many previous studies) agnostic as to whether 
banks actively discriminate against SME’s (Cosh et al 2009; Breedon 2012). i  
 
In this article we investigate how financial constraints have affected the investment 
behaviour of groups of large and of small firms in UK manufacturing, contrasting the period 
from the onset of the financial crisis with a longer sample. We focus in particular on the 
constraining role of external finance and its differential effect on groups of small and large 
firms. In particular we find that credit constraints for large and small firms diverged during 
the financial crisis in a way that disadvantaged large firms more. Nevertheless, this is in a 
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context of pre-crisis constraints on the small-firm group not observed for the large-firm 
group. Our study also addresses the question of whether any perceived constraint 
experienced by either small or large firm groups can be attributed to demand side or supply-
side influences. 
 
We use a single consistent survey data set to explore these questions. While survey data is 
often distrusted due to the lack of incentives for truthful answers, the particular data set 
that we use here has been subjected to considerable scrutiny by statistical bodies over 
many years and we report evidence of its robustness later in the paper. The remainder of 
the paper is organised in sections 2-7 detailing: (2) previous literature findings; (3) the 
hypotheses to be tested; (4) data sources and testing strategy; (5) specification; (6) results 
and discussion and (7) conclusions. 
 
2 Previous Literature: a Selective Review   
The literature, on the whole, supports the finding that small firms find it more difficult to 
access finance. This has been established both in survey-based literature for the EU (Canton 
et al 2012) and in many econometric studies in macroeconomics and finance. The 
econometric approach has mostly consisted in measuring the response to cash flow of fixed 
capital spending, inventory investment, or R&D  on the assumption that the response 
coefficient captures information on financial constraints (Carpenter and Petersen 2002; 
Bond et al 2003). The underlying theory is that this coefficient will lose significance when 
good access to capital markets allows firms to seamlessly substitute external funding for 
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internal funding.  The coefficient on cash flow for US investment has declined over time and 
is now insignificant, reflecting a greater provision of equity finance. However, for small firms 
the coefficient still appears to be positive and significant (Brown and Petersen 2009).ii   
 
Some authors view the pattern and severity of financial constraints as reflecting institutional 
differences such as the extent of bank-based lending, with SME bank finance less 
constrained in normal times but more so when banks themselves are distressed (Baum et al 
2011). Others differentiate between types of banks with those labelled relationship banks 
better able to support SMEs in crisis times, but not necessarily more supportive in normal 
times (Beck et al 2014). 
 
2.1. EU studies pre-crisis. 
For the EU area, most econometric work finds that small firms’ investment, at least in some 
countries, is affected by credit constraints or the cost of credit. Nevertheless, comparisons 
are difficult due to different definitions of size categories (Butzen et al 2003; Chatelain et al 
2003; Mizon and Vermeulen 2005). For Germany, it has been argued that financial 
constraints apply most to medium sized businesses as small firms benefit from competitive 
savings banks, while large firms tend not to be dependent on bank credit (Audretsch and 
Elston, 2002). For the EU area generally, Canton et al (2012) report on direct perceptions of 
firms, investigating perceived constraints on access to bank credit before 2008. Noting that 
asymmetry is associated with smaller firms due to lower transparency, lower collateral, less 
reputation, and higher unit monitoring costs, these authors establish that self- perceived 
constraints are indeed higher for smaller firms within the general class of SMEs. 
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2.2 UK Studies pre-crisis. 
Specific work for the UK suggests that small firms increased their access to finance during 
the 1990s (Lund and Wright, 1999). This is confirmed in Angelopoulou and Gibson (2009) 
who nevertheless find continuing supply-side constraints, especially for small firms. The 
continued existence of financial constraints is also noted in Guariglia (1999) who modified 
the approach of Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) to establish that financially constrained and 
unconstrained samples exhibited distinct inventory investment behaviour. Size also seems 
to matter in determining firms’ choice of capital intensity in times of financial constraint 
(Spaliara 2011). Other work (using the same data source as this paper) finds a 
correspondence between capacity constraints - indicating a lack of investment - and directly 
reported financial constraints (Kalckreuth 2006). The author finds that small firms’ periods 
of capacity shortage are prolonged by financial constraints – a result that is less significant 
for larger firms. However, the findings here are sometimes subtle: small firms tend to exit 
from capacity constraints faster than larger firms, apparently reflecting the type of sector 
that they populate. 
  
2.3 Financial constraints since the crisis. 
Since the financial crisis of 2007/8 there has been a raft of further work on whether 
investment constraints reflect demand side influences, a bank credit squeeze, or difficulty in 
raising finance generally (Duchin et al 2010; Bo et al 2014). In the US case it has been noted 
that net equity issued by small firms after the crisis has also been unusually low, while 
company cash holdings have actually increased, suggesting that demand for finance is the 
major issue. Furthermore, firms that were more dependent on bank credit before the crisis 
were not those that reduced their capital investment disproportionately (Kahle and Stulz 
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2011). The implication is that demand side issues such as risk attitude were more important 
and that credit was available at least for firms with strong balance sheets. Other authors, 
employing a global CFO study did find that constrained firms reduced investment plans 
significantly more than unconstrained ones; however, no differential effects of credit 
constraints were identified between firms with employment size above and below 500 
(Campello et al 2010).   
 
For countries in the Eurozone, Vermoesen et al (2013) identified a credit supply constraint 
for Belgian SMEs during the crisis (in 2009). Within that sample of SMEs, those firms with 
long term debt that needed to be rolled over in the near-term had lower capital investment 
when they were assigned to categories likely to be financially constrained. The authors 
interpret this evidence as a negative credit supply shock to certain types of SMEs in the 
financial crisis. However, these authors also report survey evidence from the European 
Central Bank to the effect that credit was tightened more for large firms than for small firms 
in the crisis period, perhaps reflecting banks’ own restricted funding and capital 
requirements. They conclude that “it cannot be ruled out that the impact of the crisis on the 
availability of external finance was smaller for SMEs than for large firms.” (p. 5). A similar 
finding was obtained for private firms in Norway at the outset of the crisis, where it was 
shown that capital investment fell more for firms that were previously unconstrained 
financially (Hetland and Mjøs 2012).  It seems that the pattern of how financial constraints 
operate in Europe is complex and diverse. Furthermore there is no consensus over whether 
perceived constraints reflect company fundamentals or are due to stress in the banking 
system (Bremus 2015). 
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For the UK, a number of investigations have be undertaken without producing consensus.  
One study, using a crisis dummy variable with interactions identified a restriction on trade 
credit but not on debt levels during the crisis (Akbar 2017). In another study, credit supply 
shocks were estimated to account for only one sixth of the output fall in the early crisis 
period (Finlay and Jääskelä 2014).  Some UK studies have attempted to use a double 
differencing approach to establish whether demand or supply influences are dominant 
determinants of change in the crisis period.  Contrasting matched lending behaviour of 
constrained banks and non-constrained banks, a more conservative lending strategy after 
the crisis was observed for the former group (effectively those that had been rescued). 
Borrowers were assumed to be unable to switch credit supplier so that any observed effect 
can be viewed as a supply constraint. A post crisis differential fall in loans was observed for 
constrained bank clients. However, it is not clear whether that effect simply reflected the 
differential quality of pre-crisis loans. Subsequent productivity or capital intensity 
differences between clients of the different lender sets were not found to be significant, so 
no negative effects were directly demonstrated (Riley et al 2014a). A similar approach is 
followed by Franklin et al (2015) using differential Credit Default Swap premia for different 
banks as an indicator of post-crisis lending capacity. The authors find that total debt and 
productivity grew less rapidly for firms banking with weaker banks. Nevertheless the finding, 
as with the case of Riley et al (2014a) do not control for the quality of pre-crisis loans made 
by the banks that cut back lending most in the post crisis period.  
 
The UK evidence is therefore not entirely clear on the extent to which changes in bank 
lending can be attributed to credit supply shocks. Nevertheless the tenor of much of the 
policy discussion is exemplified in assessments such as that in the Breedon report (2012) 
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that “on balance the evidence would indicate some constraint in the supply of bank credit” 
(p.13). This supply constraint arises both from business decisions by the banks themselves to 
strengthen balance sheets or exogenous influences such as new regulatory requirements.  
 
2.4 Differential effect on small and large firms for the UK. 
Several UK studies have also investigated differential access to credit for small and large 
firms in the crisis period. Supply and demand indicators for bank and non-bank credit to 
non-financial firms have been published by size group in the Bank of England Credit 
Conditions Survey since 2009. Since this survey is aimed at credit providers it cannot identify 
effects such as discouraged borrowing - when expected rejection curtails loan applications 
(Kon and Storey 2003; Freel et al 2012).  Discouraged borrowers are likely to be younger and 
smaller firms (Chakravarty and Xiang 2013) but they may also be “self rationing” high-risk 
borrowers (Han et al 2009). Survey data from 2012 suggests that three quarters of SME firms 
seeking external funds obtained them but that this is down from 90% before the credit crisis 
(BIS 2012). It is possible therefore that the crisis created a discouraged borrower effect and it 
has been estimated to account for 2% of the 15% fall in term loans for 2008/9 compared 
with the previous five-year average (Fraser 2013).  
 
The Bank of England credit conditions data show that both large and small firms 
experienced falling applications and approvals of loans from 2009 but that there was more 
variability on the demand side. This is confirmed in Cowling (2012) using the UK official 
Small Firm Barometer data. Perhaps surprisingly, the Bank’s data show that is only for the 
large firm sample – in the years 2009/10 – that we observe any lengthy period of tightening 
of supply along with a rising demand for credit. Other data show a greater improvement in 
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availability and approval of loans for small firms than for large firms between 2009 and 2012 
(Oxford Economics 2013).  
 
The cost of finance for small firms, as represented by credit spreads is sometimes argued to 
help identify supply and demand influences. This spread has grown both absolutely and 
relatively to other firms from 2009, suggesting some tightening of credit conditions for small 
firms. It is possible, however, that this can be explained by variation in default risk and a 
lower value of collateral. Arguably the lower rates on offer for large firms are again a 
feature of competition in the market for loans where large firms do not feel any urgent 
need to access finance, given that their holdings of liquid assets have risen in recent years as 
they have held back from investment and acquisitions (Oxford Economics 2013). In general, 
data on credit spreads are of limited use because the character and risk attributes of loans 
may be changing over time. Thus spreads may simply reflect variation in the quality of the 
units seeking and being offered credit. Because of these limitations, the UK credit conditions 
survey do not fully identify the reasons for lending variation. Furthermore, as the data 
sample is post-crisis, these Bank of England indicators are unhelpful in establishing what 
changes the crisis itself has brought about in the effects of credit conditions. 
 
3. Investment and Financial Constraints in UK Manufacturing: Hypotheses 
A priori, we would expect, for the UK case,  that size would be an important discriminator of 
access to credit since small firms  tend to lack credit ratings or good access to equity 
markets (Bougheas et al 2006). To be sure, our small firm sample will contain some high 
growth firms (accounting for some 2% by number) that are thought to rely on equity, but it 
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has been shown that such firms only turn to equity markets when debt capacity is limited 
(Vanacker and Manigart 2010). Thus, we expect: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Only small firms have a continuous financial constraint over the whole sample 
period. 
 
The debt burden that banks consider tolerable depends on the value of collateral that falls 
in recessions and thus financial constraints may be aggravated at such times, an effect 
known as the financial accelerator first identified in US research (Gertler and Gilchrist 1994; 
Bernanke et al 1996).iii  It is usually assumed that the brunt of the effect is felt by those firms 
already financially constrained but in a context of a credit crunch rather than a cyclical 
downturn, the effect may be more general (Hetland and Mjøs 2012). Accordingly we 
propose: 
 
Hypothesis 2: The financial crisis aggravated any existing financial constraints. 
 
Where restricted funding arises largely through bank credit, the incidence of financial 
constraint may be affected by size. While large firms were, at the onset of the crisis, able to 
substitute both bond and equity finance for bank credit this was not the case for small firms 
in our sample (Bank of England 2010). This suggests that the financial crisis may have 
manifested itself primarily through an increased credit constraint on small firms. However, 
as noted earlier, some survey evidence tends not to support this. We formulate: 
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Hypothesis 3A: The financial crisis negatively affected small firms’ access to finance but not 
that of large firms.  
 
Evidence reviewed earlier suggests that banks choose to ration on the basis of debt capacity 
rather than size alone. Given that banks will have allowed large and well collateralised firms 
to have the highest leverage, small firms may not have suffered any additional constraints, 
conditional on the cycle, in the crisis period. This leads to: 
 
Hypothesis 3B: The financial crisis negatively affected large firms’ access to finance but not 
that of small firms. 
 
4 Data Sources, Specification and Testing Strategy 
4.1 Data sample. 
Our data comes from the Industrial Trends Survey (ITS), a long-run quarterly database for 
UK manufacturing firms, disaggregated by size category and maintained by the main UK 
employers’ organisation, the Confederation of British Industry (CBI), since its inception in 
1958. It is a component part of the Eurostat harmonised surveys on business climate, 
detailed further in Driver et al (2005).iv Questionnaires are targeted at chief executives, 
managing directors and finance directors and are “… generally replied to by a board 
member” (Lui et al 2011, p.329). The sampling frame consists of a regular panel of 2200 
firms and a different group of respondents (1000) contacted each quarter. The sample is 
stratified in a representative way by size. Sampling and processing procedures are detailed 
in CBI (2015) including an explanation of the weighting of the responses.   The raw survey 
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data are qualitative (usually coded –1, 0, +1) at firm level and are aggregated by the CBI 
survey unit into groups (including the size categories that we use here), by adding up the 
responses, weighted by percentage of the responding firm in sales volume (Mitchell et al 
2005). We inspected the data series for outliers checking for data points outside the 
interquartile range (IQR). All but a few data points in each case were within +/- 1 IQR and 
exceptions were all explainable as reflecting the period of the financial crisis for which an 
interactive dummy variable is employed (see section 5). Accordingly there was no need for 
winsorization. 
 
The data sample is for 101 quarters from 1987 Q2 to 2012 Q2.v  The CBI Industrial Trends 
Survey questions used in this work are: 
Question 1: Are you more, or less, optimistic than you were three months ago about the 
general business situation in your industry? (Possible choices: more or same or less or n/a). 
Question 3b: Do you expect to authorise more or less capital expenditure in the next twelve 
months than you authorised in the past twelve months on: plant and machinery? (Possible 
choices: more or same or less or n/a). 
Question 4: Is your present level of output below capacity (i.e., are you working below a 
satisfactory full rate of operation)? (Possible choices: yes or no or n/a). 
Question 8: Excluding seasonal variations, what has been the trend over the PAST THREE 
MONTHS, and what are the expected trends for the NEXT THREE MONTHS, with regard to: 
volume of output? (Possible choices: up or same or down or n/a). 
Question 16c: What factors are likely to limit your capital expenditure authorisations over 
the next twelve months? (Possible choices: inadequate net return; internal finance 
shortage; inability to raise external finance; cost of finance; uncertainty about demand; 
labour shortage; other) 
 
 A large literature has considered the best transformation to convert these series to 
quantitative indicators (European Commission, 1997; see also Lamont 2000). For the 
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directional responses, the balance of the aggregated data (up minus down) may be 
interpreted as an index of the growth rate of the underlying variable which are generally 
stationary (Smith and McAleer, 1995; Driver and Urga, 2004). We use the following 
transformations: 
CAPEX: Balance of more over less for Question 3b. 
OPT: Balance of more over less for Question 1. 
OUTNEXT: Balance of up over down for Question 8 NEXT 
OUTPAST: Balance of up over down for Question 8 PAST 
CAPUTIL: Logit transformation of the count variable (percentage) responding “no” to 
Question 4 
FINCAP: Percentage of respondents responding “Inability to raise external finance” to 
Question 16c 
 
The survey data source used in this paper has been extensively used in academic research 
(Mitchell et al 2005; Kalkreuth 2006; Liu et al 2011). What makes it particularly useful for 
the purposes of this paper is that it also provides matched data on capital investment 
intentions, indicators of business optimism, and financial constraints. A natural concern with 
survey data is the representativeness of the sample and also the accuracy of the replies, 
absent incentives for respondents to reply truthfully.  Nevertheless, survey expectations 
have often been shown to be internally consistent (Dominitz and Manski, 1997; Dominitz, 
1998) and are often characterised by a close correspondence between expectations and 
outcomes (European Commission DG2, 1997). Many macro variables in common use are 
survey-based (Thaler 2015). 
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In our study, access to the micro data was not possible due to confidentiality. Our 
estimation is based on variables obtained by aggregating the micro data from the survey 
into small and large size classes.  However historical micro data has previously been made 
available to the Director of the National Institute of Economic Research (UK) to assess the 
accuracy and predictive performance of these survey data, an important issue, given their 
use in several macroeconomic models. This research found that the retrospective 
qualitative data from the CBI survey responses “plainly related” to the responses that the 
same firms gave for survey questions underlying official production statistics and that 
“confidence can be placed in the responses to questions that have no counterpart in official 
enquiries” (Lui et al 2011, p.346). In keeping with other previous work, this research 
concluded that the CBI data “offers valid indicators of the business environment.” (p.346). 
 
Our data are aggregated up into size classes by the CBI. This will have some disadvantages. 
In particular, the distribution of shocks across individual micro units are not captured and 
such variation is known to generate time-varying elasticities (Haltiwanger 1997). However to 
fully resolve this would require access to establishment data whereas the CBI micro-data 
corresponds to enterprises and groups. Use of micro-data may also introduce measurement 
error which can cancel out under aggregation (Bound et al 2001 p.3830) so that it remains 
unclear in principle which level of aggregation is best. Using standard predictability tests it 
has been found that disaggregate forecasts outperform aggregate ones for manufacturing 
output growth on an in-sample basis. Out-of-sample the evidence is mixed “…with only the 
non-parametric disaggregate indicator providing more accurate forecasts than those of the 
aggregate indicators.”(Mitchell et al , 2005 p. 496). We can reasonably assume therefore 
that our aggregated size categories contain information useful for the present study. 
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4.2 Testing strategy. 
We use the transformed variables described above to estimate investment authorisation 
equations with business optimism as the main conditioning variable. This may be regarded 
as a type of accelerator equation with the forcing variable a composite indicator of factors 
such as sales and financing costs which are well captured by the optimism variable, as 
shown in Driver (2007). This specification for an investment equation follows the arguments 
in Chirinko (1993) that direct forward looking expectations are a good alternative to implicit 
models such as those based on the Euler equation or Q models using stock market data. 
 
We included in the specification a variable on financial constraints constructed from directly 
reported responses in the CBI survey but transformed so as to be independent of the 
economic cycle. This procedure avoids conflating the supply-side financial constraint with 
cyclical factors such as demand influences that are captured by the business optimism 
variable. Specifically we obtained the residual (𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂ ) from a regression of the financial 
constraint data (FINCAP, detailed above) on two own lags and the survey-recorded data of 
capacity utilisation (CAPUTIL).vi The latter is expressed as a logit to remove skewness, given 
that it is constructed as a count variable. Our testing strategy is not to focus on the financial 
accelerator effect but to identify whether, independently of the demand cycle, the credit 
stance of banks and other intermediaries, reflecting their own lending strategies and 
capacities to lend, has affected the investment of manufacturing firms, both large and small. 
To establish whether the coefficient on this financial constraint variable changed for either 
of the size groups after the financial crisis, we interact variables with a step dummy for the 
UK financial crisis (post Q3 2007). 
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The additional variables required for the financial constraints are detailed below 
𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑪𝑨𝑷̂ : Residual from an auto-regression, order 2, of FINCAP augmented by CAPUTIL 
𝒊𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑪𝑨𝑷̂ : interaction of 𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑪𝑨𝑷̂  variable with a step dummy for the UK financial crisis 
(post 2007Q3)  
We also utilise a double interaction detailed below: 
i𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑪𝑨𝑷̂ up: interaction of 𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑪𝑨𝑷̂  variable with a step dummy for the UK financial crisis 
(post 2007Q3) and a dummy equal to one when OPT ≥0 
i𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑪𝑨𝑷̂ dw: interaction of 𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑪𝑨𝑷̂  variable with a step dummy for the UK financial crisis 
(post 2007Q3) and a dummy equal to one when OPT <0 
 
The use of directly reported financial constraints may call for some discussion. A hard 
financial constraint may be defined as the case where a firm is unable to raise capital at any 
price when it tries to do so (Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist 2015). These authors cast doubt on 
some existing proxies for financial constraints, finding that: “supposedly constrained firms 
have no difficulty obtaining credit when their demand for debt increases exogenously as a 
result of a tax increase” (p.1). Such proxies include credit ratings, text-based metrics from 
analysing company accounts or reports; and indices based on a set of financial variables 
such as market-to-book ratios and leverage. Whatever the merit of this criticism, it does not 
directly apply to our data which captures the reply to the question of whether the firm is 
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financially constrained in the sense of “inability to raise external finance”. To be clear the 
questionnaire contains alternative replies allowing the respondent to record a constraint 
arising from a cost of finance or a shortage of internal finance. Our proxy therefore relies on 
much more specific information than that criticised in Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2015). 
 
5 Econometric Specification. 
Our specification is derived from Blanchard and Fischer (1989, pp. 299–300). Maximising the 
value of the firm with capital as the only fixed factor subject to a production function with 
exogenous demand yields a closed form solution if the implied cost penalty being minimised 
is the discounted sum of out-of-equilibrium and capital adjustment costs. Under some 
plausible restrictions this reduces to a linear relationship between our survey measures of 
investment intentions (CAPEX) and profit expectations or business optimism (OPT) (Driver et 
al 2005). We augment this relationship with a term in external finance constraint (𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂ ), 
defined earlier as a cyclically adjusted version of the survey response on financial 
constraints. The specification is completed by adding interaction terms for the period after 
the onset of the UK financial crisis (Q3 2007), indicated by a lower case i before the variable, 
e.g. i𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂  represents the interaction of the 𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂  variable with the post 2007 
dummy. The same specification is used for each of the two size groups. vii 
 
Estimation by OLS will lead to endogeneity bias as the optimism variable is likely to co-vary 
with the investment decision, so that there is a need to find suitable instruments for the 
recorded optimism. Fortunately there are at least two previous contributions that suggests 
a choice of instruments.  An early special survey by the CBI itself found that optimism 
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primarily reflected future demand, with interest rates being a second concern - this was a 
period of high real rates - while domestic politics and exchange rates were mentioned as 
minority concerns (Junankar 1989). A later paper published by the Institute for Fiscal Studies 
reported estimation of the optimism variable disaggregated by size with OLS and SURE. This 
confirmed that past and future demand indicators were the main drivers for all size groups 
with weak significance for the real interest rate (Driver 2007). In the light of this evidence 
we instrumented optimism by the first lag of the survey-based indicator of reported past 
output growth (OUTPASTt-1) and the contemporaneous indicator of output growth 
expectations (OUTNEXTt). The financial constraint variables (𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂ ) are not instrumented 
as they are constructed as a residual from a regression on a capacity utilisation index and 
two lags of the dependent variable. The IV equations system is thus specified for each of the 
two size groups as: 
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑖𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑂𝑃𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂ 𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂ 𝑡−1
+ 𝛽6𝑖𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂ 𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑖𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂ 𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡 
𝑂𝑃𝑇𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑂𝑈𝑇𝑁𝐸𝑋𝑇𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑂𝑈𝑇𝑃𝐴𝑆𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝑒𝑡 
Descriptive statistics for each time series of the size groups are given in Table 1. This shows 
that for the optimism variable there are similar statistics (mean and SD) for both large and 
small firms with a consistent bias towards pessimism. There are differences between large 
and small firms in the balance of up- over - down expectations for the past and the future 
volume of output. The small firms’ group report half the expected trend of output compared 
to large firms. Moreover, the mean balance of the past 3 months is negative for small firms 
reflecting the fact that sharp falls in output for extreme cases are not smoothed by 
aggregation as they would be for larger units. In general, differences in means between the 
two samples are statistically significant except for the optimism variable.  
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Table 2 contains the correlation matrices for the full period and the period up to the 
financial crisis. It may be seen that the correlations for the small firms’ variables are higher 
than those for the large firms’ variables (in absolute terms) with the exception of 𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂ .   
6 Results and Discussion 
Table 3 reports IV investment equations. For both sets of firms, Table 3 shows a high F-
statistic for OPT (significant at the 0.1% level), obtained in the first stage regression. This 
indicates no weak instruments and we therefore focus on the IV results, with the OLS results 
reported in Appendix A, Table A1 for reference. The need for robust estimators is indicated 
by the Breusch-Pagan/Godfrey statistics test which fails to reject heteroscedasticity in the IV 
equations. Accordingly, robust standard errors are reported throughout. The Hansen-Sargan 
test (consistent in the presence of heteroscedasticity) rejects correlation between the error 
term and the instruments.  
 
Comparing the results across the two size samples, the adjustment speed, indicated by the 
lagged dependent variable is slightly higher for small firms, as expected. However, in the 
crisis period, for small firms, this coefficient is reduced to zero with the test for equality 
between CAPEX and –iCAPEX comfortably accepted. This seems to indicate that firms were 
not using past investment as a guide in this period, which probably reflects a shock to 
uncertainty.  By contrast, there was no significance for such an interaction term for large 
firms where adjustment is dampened by heterogeneity over business lines. 
 
 The optimism coefficient is clearly confirmed as endogenous by the Hausman test for the 
small firm group; for the large firms, the p-statistic of about 5% for this test is marginal at 
22 
 
conventional levels. The optimism coefficients are broadly similar across the two size 
categories at about 0.5. Previous literature has shown that survey responses of the type 
used here can be interpreted as approximate rates of change and thus a coefficient of 0.5 
would indicate an impact response elasticity of about a half and, at least for the large firm 
group a long-run elasticity of about unity. 
 
6.1 Results for Financial Constraints 
The remaining coefficients relate to financial constraints that are the focus of this paper. 
Each of the columns in Table 3 differs according to whether a lag is included and whether an 
interaction is included for the financial crisis. For small firms the interaction is never 
significant and the financial constraint appears to operate contemporaneously and with a 
lag. Thus there appears to be no differential financial constraint associated with the crisis for 
this group. For large firms, only the interaction coefficients are significant and negative 
indicating that financial constraints bite only in the period of the crisis. The lagged 
interaction term i𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂ (-1) is significant with p-values between 0.02 and 0.06 and with 
some indication of significance for the contemporaneous interaction as well. There is thus 
considerable difference between the pattern of financial constraints observed for the small 
and large firm groups, both generally and for the crisis period. 
 
We now comment on the hypotheses outlined in Section 3. Hypothesis 1 is confirmed by the 
finding in Table 3 that, only for the small firm group, is there a significant coefficient on the 
financial constraint variable outside of the financial crisis. For both 𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂  and its lag, 
significance at the 1% level or less for the small group contrasts with the clear rejection of 
the hypothesis for the large group. Hypothesis 2 is not confirmed. Only in the case of large 
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firms is there an increased financial constraint in the crisis period with the lagged interaction 
term significantly negative in the first and last columns. In fact the crisis period is the only 
time in which the large firm group suffers from financial constraint, as confirmed by the 
joint test on  𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂  and its lag, as contrasted with the tests on i𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂  and its lag in the 
final rows of the table. These findings are relevant to Hypotheses 3A and 3B since we have 
already noted that the small firm group’s constraint, cyclically adjusted, does not 
deteriorate during the financial crisis, whereas this period is when the large firm group 
experiences a constraint for the first time, as already noted. We thus reject 3A in favour of 
3B. 
 
Table 4 shows results for exactly the same specification as Table 3 but with the variables 
now expressed as standardised variables. The variables in Table 4 are demeaned, and 
divided by the sample period standard deviation so that they are expressed in units of 
standard deviation from the mean. The interaction terms are then formed as before. We 
can interpret the coefficients, as the effect of one standard deviation change in the 
independent variables in terms of the number of standard deviation changes in the 
intention to invest. However, as noted earlier since the main survey variables such as 
investment and optimism are already approximations to rates of change we do not expect 
there to be great differences between the tables for the coefficients on these variables. The 
similarity is confirmed by comparing the coefficients for the two size categories across 
Tables 3 and 4. These are of roughly similar magnitude though the optimism effect for small 
firms seems slightly stronger in the standardised coefficients in Table 4 both absolutely and 
in comparison with large firms. 
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There are substantial differences between the standardized and the unstandardized results 
in respect of the financial constraint coefficients. As these variables and interactions are 
constructed as residuals we do not expect the coefficients to be invariant between the two 
tables and here it may be preferable to use Table 4 in understanding the relative magnitude 
of the effects. The economic significance of these distinct patterns between the two size 
groups is two-fold. For normal periods, the results confirm that only small firms face 
financial constraints. Nevertheless this  effect is fairly substantial with a one standard 
deviation change in the constraint variable resulting in an approximate 0.2 standard 
deviation fall in investment summed over two quarters for which the impact is recorded. 
The long-term effect is greater, given the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable, and 
is approximately double the impact effect. For the financial crisis period, these constraints 
also operate but there is no differential additional effect, conditional on the other 
regressors, for the small firms group. However, for the large firm group, the effect of financial 
constraints in the financial crisis is substantial. It is two to three times bigger than the effect 
for small firms observed over the full sample period when measured in terms of the ratios of 
standard deviations of investment to that of financial constraints. 
 
Table 5 provides a closer focus on the crisis period. The interaction variable (i𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂ ) is 
now differentiated by whether business optimism is rising (i𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂ up) or falling 
(i𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂ dw). The general pattern of the results is stable as compared with those in Table 
3. The change in specification makes very little difference for the small firm group where the 
interaction terms for 𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂  are all insignificant. However, for the large firm group, it is 
notable that the financial interaction effects are only significant when optimism is falling 
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(i𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂ dw and i𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂ dw(-1)). Similar results were found with a step dummy based on 
Lehman Brothers collapse (post Q3 2008) as shown in Table 5 in the right-most column of 
each of the two groups, though this date is not the most appropriate for the UK economy. A 
final robustness check was made by repeating the Table 5 analysis on the pooled sample 
with an intercept dummy and interactive slope dummies: see Appendix A, Table A2. Pooling 
might offer an advantage of extra degrees of freedom were homogeneity of error variances 
across groups to be a valid assumption. However this approach is less suitable where error 
variances are unequal (Schepers 2016, Holgersson et al 2016). In our case we found a 
significant difference when comparing the two groups residual standard deviations 
(p=0.0000), suggesting that caution is warranted in the use of the dummy variable 
approach. Nevertheless the pooled results confirmed the same pattern of results as in the 
separate regressions with 𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̃  being negative and highly significant for the base (small) 
group but the large group interaction only significant for the crisis period when business 
optimism was falling, as observed already for the single equations in Table 5. viii 
 
6.2. Conclusions on financial constraints.  
The UK experience is thus one of continuous financial constraint for small firms but no 
additional unexpected (demand conditioned) handicap for them in the crisis period. This 
does not of course mean that small firms in the crisis period did not experience a reduction 
in bank lending. However there is no firm evidence that this was mainly supply led. Nor does 
it suggest that a recovery was stymied by changed behaviour of credit providers to small 
firms particularly. If anything the crisis lesson for financial constraint was how abruptly the 
large firm group encountered difficulty and, as noted in Table 4, how substantial the 
financial constraint coefficient is for the large firm group in the crisis period.  For 
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completeness, it should also be recognised that any large firm effect may have impinged 
indirectly on SMEs who may depend on the financial health of large firms to obtain trade 
credit when other forms of finance are unavailable (McGuinness and Hogan 2014; Akbar et 
al 2017). 
 
Our findings are based on a source that has consistent information on small and large firms 
over a long period that includes the financial crisis. This comprehensive data is unusual and 
makes our results difficult to compare fully with other work. Differences in definition or 
sample also makes for difficulties in comparison; for example our sample is not 
representative of very small or micro firms (with 1-9 employees) that constitute a large 
fraction of some other academic studies of financial constraints (Cowling et al 2012; Lee et 
al 2015). Nevertheless some comparisons with previous results may be drawn. Our findings 
echo those of other researchers who report a particular increase in constraints for large 
firms during the crisis period (Hetland and Mjøs 2012). Our results concerning different 
patterns of finance constraints for small and large firms are consistent with Riley et al 
(2014b) who find that bank credit constraints for large firms ended several years after the 
onset of the crisis while small firms experienced continuing constraints. Our findings on 
SMEs are somewhat at odds with Armstrong et al. (2013), who found that rejection rates for 
SME firms’ loans of low and average risk were significantly higher in the period from 2008–9 
onwards, compared with the period since 2001 even controlling for some risk factors. We 
cannot be sure however whether this is the result of different propensities to apply for such 
loans (which would be reflected in rejection rates) or omitted risk factors such as debt.  
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6.3 Policy issues. 
A common view of the UK economy in the financial crisis is that small firms were most 
severely affected by credit constraints and this prevented an early recovery in capital 
investment. We have shown that this story lacks robust evidence. Although small firms were 
credit rationed, this was no more severe on a cyclically adjusted basis that would have been 
expected historically. Rather it is large firms that were unusually affected. This correction to 
general perceptions matters for policy. It would be a mistake for policymakers to focus 
exclusively on the supply of credit to firms when the underlying problem may be more that 
firms’ appetite to invest has been reduced for non-financial reasons.ix As we noted from 
Table 5 the crisis-specific financial constraints (for large firms) are only observed for periods 
of falling optimism. It seems unlikely therefore that financial constraints can fully explain the 
continued caution of such firms in relation to capital investment, even as general business 
confidence recovered over the crisis period (Oxford Economic Forecasting 2013). More 
recent survey evidence from the Bank of England has shown that UK firms have continued 
to under-invest. One third of firms recognised themselves as investing less than appropriate 
compared with only 2% that were overinvesting. Firms also believed the return on 
investment to be significantly higher than their cost of capital. Eighty percent of those 
perceived to be underinvesting responded “yes” to whether financial market pressures for 
short term returns were an obstacle to investment. However, external finance features only 
in third place as constraining investment for a given level of internal funds (Saleheen et al 
2017). The lesson that can be drawn from this, in conjunction with our own results, is that 
while financial constraints can matter for all firms for some periods -  and for small firms 
perennially -  such constraints on capital investment may be overshadowed by non-financial 
ones including the role of investor preference for cash now over return later . Certainly we 
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have not been able to establish that cyclically adjusted financial constraints became more 
severe for our small firm sample in the financial crisis.x 
7 Overall Conclusions 
There is a time pattern to the coefficients for financial constraints with respect to capital 
investment that is distinct between the group of small firms and the group of large firms. 
Large firms’ sensitivity to financial constraints emerged only during the crisis period. For 
small firms, on the other hand, the effect is perennial and does not seem to have been 
increased in the crisis, once other determinants of investment are taken into account. These 
results are important findings, given that the literature reviewed earlier has not 
demonstrated consensus about the effects of the crisis. Furthermore our approach allows us 
to interpret the results as relating to supply-side financial constraints, separate from cyclical 
influences that influence firms requests for credit i.e. demand-side influences.  A further 
finding of this paper is that the financial constraint experienced in the crisis by the large 
firms group operates only for worsening business optimism; there is no evidence for such an 
effect when optimism is rising. This last result suggests that the failure of investment to 
recover substantially even in the face of rising optimism cannot be attributed primarily to 
financial constraints, a finding that recently been reinforced by survey evidence from the 
Bank of England.  Policy in regard to investment in the upturn may require a shift from 
monetary policy to fiscal policy (Sawyer 2012) along the lines of reducing uncertainty in 
regard to the output path and implementing measures to encourage a long-term focus for 
investors.  
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TABLE 1 Time Series Descriptive Statistics 
Quarterly observations, data sample from 1987 Q2 to 2012 Q2 
 Small Firm Group Large Firm Group Mean 
difference test 
small vs. large 
firms 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
CAPEX -8.030 15.221 -45 21 -5.079 21.187 -75 33 -2.951** 
OPT 
-
11.040 
22.496 -64 36 
-
10.911 
22.827 -71 29 -0.129 
OUTNEXT 3.178 15.356 -43 37 6.386 17.351 -61 40 -3.208** 
OUTPAST -3.248 17.712 -51 33 1.287 19.548 -58 38 -4.535*** 
CAPUTIL -0.482 0.410 -1.276 0.532 -0.371 0.587 -3.178 0.847 -0.111*** 
𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂  0.010 1.383 -4.251 5.401 -0.003 3.158 -5.520 15.044 0.013 
The number of observations is 101. CAPEX: Balance of more over less for Question 3b CBI Industrial Trends Survey. OPT: Balance of more 
over less for Question 1. OUTNEXT: Balance of up over down for Question 8 NEXT. OUTPAST: Balance of up over down for Question 8 
PAST. CAPUTIL: Logit transformation of the count variable (percentage) responding no to Question 4. FINCAP: Balance of answers Inability 
to raise external finance Question 16c. 𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑪𝑨𝑷̂ : Residual from an autoregression, order 2, of FINCAP augmented by CAPUTIL. i𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑪𝑨𝑷̂ : 
interaction of 𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑪𝑨𝑷̂  variable with a step dummy for the UK financial crisis (post 2007Q3). Mean difference test between small and 
large firms, with*** mean difference significant at 1%, ** significant at 5% and * significant at 10% 
 
 
TABLE 2 Correlation Matrixes 
Small Firm Group 
Data sample from 1987 Q2 to 2012 Q2 Data sample from 1987 Q2 to 2007 Q2 
 
CAPEX OPT OUTNEXT OUTPAST CAPUTIL 𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂  CAPEX OPT OUTNEXT OUTPAST CAPUTIL 𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂  
CAPEX 1 
 
    1      
OPT 0.780*** 1 
 
   0.787*** 1     
OUTNEXT 0.913*** 0.841*** 1 
 
  0.908*** 0.857*** 1    
OUTPAST 0.890*** 0.678*** 0.834*** 1 
 
 0.910*** 0.60*** 0.850*** 1   
CAPUTIL 0.713*** 0.442*** 0.634*** 0.795*** 1 
 
0.738*** 0.365*** 0.645*** 0.799*** 1  
𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂  0.030 0.049 0.006 0.030 0.006 1 0.190* 0.258** 0.168 0.155 0.087 1 
* Correlation significant at 1%, ** significant at 5% and *** significant at 10%  
  
Large Firm Group  
Data sample from 1987 Q2 to 2012 Q2 Data sample from 1987 Q2 to 2007 Q2 
 
CAPEX OPT OUTNEXT OUTPAST CAPUTIL 𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂  CAPEX OPT OUTNEXT OUTPAST CAPUTIL 𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂  
CAPEX 1      1      
OPT 0.523*** 1     0.569*** 1     
OUTNEXT 0.680*** 0.648*** 1    0.509*** 0.776*** 1    
OUTPAST 0.671*** 0.547*** 0.702*** 1   0.598*** 0.577*** 0.681*** 1   
CAPUTIL 0.462*** 0.351*** 0.421*** 0.546*** 1  0.463*** 0.155 0.398*** 0.575*** 1  
𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂  -0.262*** -0.258*** -0.326*** -0.187* -0.001 1 -0.078 -0.201* -0.031 -0.029 0.162 1 
The number of observations is 101 for the full sample from 1987 Q2 to 2012 Q2 and 81 observations for the sample 1987 Q2 to 2007 Q2. 
*** Correlation significant at 1%, ** significant at 5% and * significant at 10%. CAPEX: Balance of more over less for Question 3b CBI 
Industrial Trends Survey. OPT: Balance of more over less for Question 1. OUTNEXT: Balance of up over down for Question 8 NEXT. 
OUTPAST: Balance of up over down for Question 8 PAST. CAPUTIL: Logit transformation of the count variable (percentage) responding no 
to Question 4. FINCAP: Balance of answers Inability to raise external finance Question 16c. 𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑪𝑨𝑷̂ : Residual from an autoregression, 
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order 2, of FINCAP augmented by CAPUTIL. i𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑪𝑨𝑷̂ : interaction of 𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑪𝑨𝑷̂  variable with a step dummy for the UK financial crisis (post 
2007Q3).  
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TABLE 3  Investment Equation (IV) 
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑖𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑂𝑃𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂ 𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂ 𝑡−1
+ 𝛽6𝑖𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂ 𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑖𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂ 𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡 
𝑂𝑃𝑇𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑂𝑈𝑇𝑁𝐸𝑋𝑇𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑂𝑈𝑇𝑃𝐴𝑆𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝑒𝑡 
The data sample is from 1987 Q2 to 2012 Q2. The interactive dummy is equal to 1 from 2007 Q3. 
  Small Firm Group Large Firm Group 
Constant 
0.48 0.56 0.47 2.39 3.52 2.39 
CAPEX(-1) 
0.55*** 0.50*** 0.55*** 0.46*** 0.39*** 0.46*** 
iCAPEX(-1) 
-0.59*** -0.50*** -0.58*** -0.10 -0.09 -0.10 
OPT 
0.49*** 0.52*** 0.49*** 0.41*** 0.57** 0.41*** 
𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂  
-1.01*** -0.97** -1.06** 0.15   
𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂ (-1) 
-1.53***  -1.61*** -0.02 0.11  
i𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂  
-0.16 0.08  -1.81  -1.66* 
i𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂ (-1) 
-0.25   -2.42** -2.75* -2.45** 
 
Disturbance is homoscedastic 
Breusch-Pagan/Godfrey statistic 
22.90*** 21.68*** 18.54*** 16.77** 19.04*** 16.64** 
Hansen J-statistic 
3.17* 3.17* 2.55 0.62 0.04 0.55 
First-stage regressions of OPT 
F-test 
40.52*** 37.25*** 44.33*** 17.93*** 16.82*** 15.59*** 
Tests of endogeneity of OPT 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman 
35.65*** 38.38*** 34.28*** 3.88** 10.00*** 3.73* 
CAPEX(-1)+iCAPEX(-1)=0 0.07 0.00 0.05 3.54* 1.33 3.49* 
𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂ =𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂ (-1)=0 16.55***  11.87*** 0.04   
i𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂ = i𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂ (-1)=0 0.04   5.92*  7.96** 
𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂ =𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂ (-1)=i𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂ = 
i𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂ (-1)=0 
18.90***   7.99*   
Obs 101 101 101 101 101 101 
Statistical significance is calculated using robust standard errors; *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5% and * significant at 10%. The 
Breusch-Pagan/Godfrey test is used to test for the presence of heteroscedasticity. Under the null of no heteroscedasticity the error of the 
regression is normally distributed. Similar results were found with the White/Koenker tests, not included in the table. The Hansen-Sargan 
or J-Test for overidentying restrictions has a joint null hypothesis to test if the instruments are valid instruments - uncorrelated with the 
error term and that the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation- A rejection of the null questions the 
validity of the instruments. CAPEX: Balance of more over less for Question 3b CBI Industrial Trends Survey. OPT: Balance of more over less 
for Question 1. OUTNEXT: Balance of up over down for Question 8 NEXT. OUTPAST: Balance of up over down for Question 8 PAST. 
CAPUTIL: Logit transformation of the count variable (percentage) responding no to Question 4. FINCAP: Balance of answers Inability to 
raise external finance Question 16c. 𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑪𝑨𝑷̂ : Residual from an autoregression, order 2, of FINCAP augmented by CAPUTIL. i𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑪𝑨𝑷̂ : 
interaction of 𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑪𝑨𝑷̂  variable with a step dummy for the UK financial crisis (post 2007Q3). 
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TABLE 4 Standardised Variables Investment Equation (IV) 
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑖𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑂𝑃𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂ 𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂ 𝑡−1
+ 𝛽6𝑖𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂ 𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑖𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂ 𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡 
𝑂𝑃𝑇𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑂𝑈𝑇𝑁𝐸𝑋𝑇𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑂𝑈𝑇𝑃𝐴𝑆𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝑒𝑡 
The data sample is from 1987 Q2 to 2012 Q2. The interactive dummy is equal to 1 from 2007 Q3. 
Variable names are in bold to differentiate from Table 3. 
  Small Firm Group Large Firm Group 
Constant -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 0.04 0.03 0.04 
CAPEX(-1) 0.54*** 0.53*** 0.54*** 0.44*** 0.36** 0.44*** 
iCAPEX(-1) -0.50*** -0.47*** -0.51*** -0.04 -0.01 -0.04 
OPT 0.69*** 0.68*** 0.68*** 0.44*** 0.61** 0.45*** 
𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂  -0.08**  -0.06 0.02   
𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂ (-1) -0.13*** -0.12*** -0.12** -0.01 0.01  
i𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂  0.04   -0.26  -0.24* 
i𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂ (-1) 0.04 0.03  -0.34* -0.39* -0.35** 
 
Disturbance is homoscedastic 
Breusch-Pagan/Godfrey statistic 
22.80*** 10.63 19.61*** 19.07** 23.29*** 19.02*** 
Hansen J-statistic 4.05** 3.37* 3.28* 0.66 0.06 0.59 
First-stage regressions of OPT  
F-test 
42.70*** 42.72*** 50.65*** 18.17*** 17.18*** 15.83*** 
Tests of endogeneity of OPT 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman 
34.76*** 34.72*** 32.14*** 3.96** 10.00*** 3.82* 
CAPEX(-1)+iCAPEX(-1)=0 0.06 0.15 0.05 3.77* 1.58 3.72* 
𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂ =𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂ (-1)=0 13.53***  5.95* 0.04   
i𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂ = i𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂ (-1)=0 0.13    5.12*  6.81** 
𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂ =𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂ (-1)=i𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂ = 
i𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂ (-1)=0 
14.28**    6.86   
Obs 101 101 101 101 101 101 
All variables are standardised as the original data subtracted by the mean and divided by the sample period standard deviation so that they are expressed in 
units of standard deviation. Statistical significance is calculated using robust standard errors; *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5% and * significant at 
10%. The Breusch-Pagan/Godfrey test is used to test for the presence of heteroscedasticity. Under the null of no heteroscedasticity the error of the regression 
is normally distributed. Similar results were found with the White/Koenker tests, not included in the table. The Hansen-Sargan or J-Test for overidentying 
restrictions has a joint null hypothesis to test if the instruments are valid instruments - uncorrelated with the error term and that the excluded instruments are 
correctly excluded from the estimated equation- A rejection of the null questions the validity of the instruments. CAPEX: Balance of more over less for 
Question 3b CBI Industrial Trends Survey. OPT: Balance of more over less for Question 1. OUTNEXT: Balance of up over down for Question 8 NEXT. OUTPAST: 
Balance of up over down for Question 8 PAST. CAPUTIL: Logit transformation of the count variable (percentage) responding no to Question 4. FINCAP: Balance 
of answers Inability to raise external finance Question 16c. 𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑪𝑨𝑷̂ : Residual from an autoregression, order 2, of FINCAP augmented by CAPUTIL. i𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑪𝑨𝑷̂ : 
interaction of 𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑪𝑨𝑷̂  variable with a step dummy for the UK financial crisis (post 2007Q3).  
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TABLE 5 Modified Investment Specification (IV) 
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑖𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑂𝑃𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂ 𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂ 𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝑖𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑢𝑝̂ 𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑖𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑑𝑤̂ 𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑖𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑢𝑝̂ 𝑡−1 + 𝛽9𝑖𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑑𝑤̂ 𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡 
𝑂𝑃𝑇𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑂𝑈𝑇𝑁𝐸𝑋𝑇𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑂𝑈𝑇𝑃𝐴𝑆𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝑒𝑡  
The data sample is from 1987 Q2 to 2012 Q2. 
  Small Firm Group Large Firm Group 
 Interactive dummy from 2007 Q3 
Dummy from 
2008 Q3 
Interactive dummy from 2007 Q3 
Dummy from 
2008 Q3 
Constant 0.49 0.51 0.48 0.47 2.50 2.51 2.54 2.57 
CAPEX(-1) 0.55*** 0.51*** 0.55*** 0.55*** 0.48*** 0.48*** 0.48*** 0.49*** 
iCAPEX(-1) -0.57*** -0.52*** -0.57*** -0.58*** -0.15 -0.15 -0.13 -0.16 
OPT 0.49*** 0.49*** 0.49*** 0.49*** 0.37*** 0.38*** 0.38*** 0.38*** 
𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂  -1.13***  -1.15*** -1.13*** 0.10  0.13 0.10 
𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂  (-1) -1.59***  -1.58*** -1.58*** -0.04  -0.26 -0.04 
i𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂ up -0.30 -1.16  -0.74 0.04 0.14  -0.01 
i𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂ dw 0.35 -0.71 0.36 0.37 -2.19* -2.09*** -2.10** -2.19* 
i𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂ up(-1) -0.02 -1.53  -0.52 -1.09 -1.13  -1.16 
i𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂ dw(-1) -0.03 -1.62 -0.07 -0.06 -3.56*** -3.60*** -3.26*** -3.56*** 
 
Disturbance is homoscedastic 
Breusch-Pagan/Godfrey statistic 
26.27*** 19.20** 25.70*** 26.87*** 24.59*** 24.41*** 24.44*** 23.69*** 
Hansen J-statistic 3.05* 3.069* 3.067* 3.19* 0.86 0.77 0.89 0.86 
First-stage regressions of OPT 
F-test 
41.81*** 42.22*** 41.27*** 41.92*** 27.27*** 22.53*** 21.21*** 27.68*** 
Tests of endogeneity of OPT Durbin-
Wu-Hausman 
39.99*** 36.92*** 34.19*** 36.86*** 2.92* 2.79* 3.09* 2.91* 
CAPEX(-1)+iCAPEX(-1)=0 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03 2.83* 2.78* 2.95* 2.50 
𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂ =𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂ -1=0 19.52***  19.49*** 19.49*** 0.02  0.28 0.02 
i𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂ dw=i𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂ dw(-1)=0 0.03 1.03 0.04 0.04 8.80** 11.80*** 8.81** 8.94** 
i𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂ up=i𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂ up(-1)=0 0.02 0.79  0.10 0.71 0.92  0.75 
i𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂ up=i𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂ dw=0 0.05 0.31  0.12 3.99 6.70**  3.90 
i𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂ up(-1)=i𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂ dw(-1)=0 0.00 1.64  0.09 10.57*** 12.53***  10.69*** 
Obs 101 101 101 101 101 101 101 101 
Statistical significance is calculated using robust standard errors; *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5% and * significant at 10%. The Breusch-Pagan/Godfrey test is used to test for the presence of heteroscedasticity. Under the null of no 
heteroscedasticity the error of the regression is normally distributed. Similar results were found with the White/Koenker tests, not included in the table. The Hansen-Sargan or J-Test for overidentying restrictions has a joint null hypothesis to test 
if the instruments are valid instruments - uncorrelated with the error term and that the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation- A rejection of the null questions the validity of the instruments. i𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑪𝑨𝑷̂ up: 
interaction of 𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑪𝑨𝑷̂  variable with a step dummy for the UK financial crisis (post 2007Q3) and a dummy equal to one when OPT ≥0. i𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑪𝑨𝑷̂ dw: interaction of 𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑪𝑨𝑷̂  variable with a step dummy for the UK 
financial crisis (post 2007Q3) and a dummy equal to one when OPT <0. The far right column for each firm size group present results using an interactive dummy from the Lehman Brothers collapse (post 2008Q3).  
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Appendix A 
 
TABLE A1 Investment Equation (OLS) 
𝐺𝐼𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐺𝐼𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑖𝐺𝐼𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑂𝑃𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐹𝑋𝑅𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐹𝑋𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝑖𝐹𝑋𝑅𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑖𝐹𝑋𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡 
The data sample is from 1987 Q2 to 2012 Q2. The interactive dummy is equal to 1 from 2007 Q3.  
  Small Firm Group Large Firm Group 
Constant -0.02 -0.05 0.78 0.92 
CAPEX(-1) 0.67*** 0.67*** 0.55*** 0.54*** 
iCAPEX(-1) -0.47*** -0.44*** -0.08 -0.08 
OPT 0.32*** 0.32*** 0.23*** 0.24*** 
𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂  -0.49 -0.77 -0.20  
𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂ (-1) -1.44*** -1.61*** -0.18  
i𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂  -0.85  -1.70 -1.90* 
i𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂ (-1) -0.59  -1.99* -2.19** 
 
CAPEX(-1)+iCAPEX(-1)=0 
 
2.17 
 
3.91* 
 
6.74** 
 
6.81** 
Observations 101 101 101 101 
Statistical significance is calculated using robust standard errors; *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5% and * significant at 10%. CAPEX: 
Balance of more over less for Question 3b CBI Industrial Trends Survey. OPT: Balance of more over less for Question 1. OUTNEXT: Balance 
of up over down for Question 8 NEXT. OUTPAST: Balance of up over down for Question 8 PAST. CAPUTIL: Logit transformation of the count 
variable (percentage) responding no to Question 4. FINCAP: Balance of answers Inability to raise external finance Question 16c. 𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑪𝑨𝑷̂ : 
Residual from an autoregression, order 2, of FINCAP augmented by CAPUTIL. i𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑪𝑨𝑷̂ : interaction of 𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑪𝑨𝑷̂  variable with a step 
dummy for the UK financial crisis (post 2007Q3). 
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TabIe A2 Modified Investment Specification (IV) pooled regression 
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑖𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑂𝑃𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂ 𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂ 𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝑖𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑢𝑝̂ 𝑡
+ 𝛽7𝑖𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑑𝑤̂ 𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑖𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑢𝑝̂ 𝑡−1 + 𝛽9𝑖𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑑𝑤̂ 𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡 
𝑂𝑃𝑇𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑂𝑈𝑇𝑁𝐸𝑋𝑇𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑂𝑈𝑇𝑃𝐴𝑆𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝑒𝑡  
The data sample is from 1987 Q2 to 2012 Q2. 
  Pooled regression Small and Large Firm Groups 
 Interactive dummy from 2007 Q3 
Constant 0.22 0.34 0.24 
CAPEX(-1) 0.52*** 0.51*** 0.52*** 
iCAPEX(-1) -0.28* -0.26* -0.25* 
OPT 0.43*** 0.43*** 0.43*** 
𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂  -0.80**  -0.90** 
𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂  (-1) -1.32***  -1.29*** 
i𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂ up -1.59 -2.14  
i𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂ dw 0.90 0.13 1.20 
i𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂ up(-1) -0.70 -1.95  
i𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂ dw(-1) 0.44 -0.92 0.41 
𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 2.99* 2.78* 2.96* 
𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 ∗ 𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂  0.99  1.14 
𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 ∗ 𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂  (-1) 1.36**  1.02 
𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 ∗i𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂ up 1.71 2.44  
𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 ∗i𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂ dw -3.23 -2.25 -3.42 
𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 ∗i𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂ up(-1) -0.82 0.48  
𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 ∗i𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂ dw(-1) -4.37** -2.96* -3.93** 
Disturbance is homoscedastic Breusch-Pagan/Godfrey statistic 89.46*** 84.54*** 87.81*** 
Hansen J-statistic 2.24 1.91 2.22 
First-stage regressions of OPT 
F-test 
67.13*** 61.18*** 56.39*** 
Tests of endogeneity of OPT Durbin-Wu-Hausman 15.31*** 15.41*** 15.48*** 
Obs 202 202 202 
Statistical significance is calculated using robust standard errors; *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5% and * significant at 10%. The Breusch-
Pagan/Godfrey test is used to test for the presence of heteroscedasticity. Under the null of no heteroscedasticity the error of the regression is normally 
distributed. Similar results were found with the White/Koenker tests, not included in the table. The Hansen-Sargan or J-Test for overidentying restrictions has 
a joint null hypothesis to test if the instruments are valid instruments - uncorrelated with the error term and that the excluded instruments are correctly 
excluded from the estimated equation- A rejection of the null questions the validity of the instruments. i𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑪𝑨𝑷̂ up: interaction of 𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑪𝑨𝑷̂  variable 
with a step dummy for the UK financial crisis (post 2007Q3) and a dummy equal to one when OPT ≥0. i𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑪𝑨𝑷̂ dw: interaction of 𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑪𝑨𝑷̂  
variable with a step dummy for the UK financial crisis (post 2007Q3) and a dummy equal to one when OPT <0. The prefix large denotes the 
interactive term for the large firm group. 
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ENDNOTES 
i The observation of supply constraints for small firms after the crisis may also reflect that if anything SME 
funding may have been too easy in boom periods in the UK (Hughes 1997). On this account the policy 
challenge is to  smooth this cycle through better intermediation and scrutiny e.g. via co-operative or mutual 
guarantee schemes and plural sources of finance such as equity, aggregated bond facilities, and peer to peer 
lending (Hutton and Peasnell 2011; Breedon 2012).  
 
ii In the remainder of this section we focus mostly on the EU and UK. Time series evidence on other countries 
including The US and Japan is presented in OECD (2015).We do not engage here with the complex debates 
over the interpretation of the cash flow coefficient following the initial contribution by Fazzari et al (1988). For 
an overview and critique see Lewellen and Lewellen (2011); D’Espallier and Guariglia (2015); Farre-Mensa and 
Ljungqvist (2015). Alternative indirect metrics of financial constraint categorising firms by variables such as 
leverage , cash holdings and dividends have also be argued to be uninformative  (Hadlock et al 2010). 
 
iii Debt may also independently lower the demand for investment (Hernando and Martínez-Carrascal 2008). 
 
iv For information on how the data is used by the EC see: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/surveys/index_en.htm. 
Long-established surveys with similar questions and formats are also conducted by business or public 
organisations in the former British dominion countries of Australia, Canada and South Africa. 
 
v Prior to this starting date the format of some of the survey questions was different. The end date in 2012 is 
justified by the extended period over which financial constraints lasted. “The cost of new [Bank] borrowing 
relative to Bank Rate peaked in around early 2009 and has since declined, albeit with a further rise in 2011 and 
2012 in response to the effects of the Euro Area crisis on UK banks.” (Riley et al 2014b). 
 
vi Given that the  𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐴𝑃̂  measures are generated variables, constructed as a residual from a regression, 
there may be a concern that the standard errors are underestimated (Pagan 1984; Murphy and Topel 1985). 
Much of the literature on this deals with methods to correct it for large samples where asymptotic properties 
are assumed. Re-estimation of a small sample in Barro (1977) by Murphy and Topel (1985) shows that the 
three terms representing the generated variable have t-values in the main regression that are on average 20% 
less than the corrected t-values. Were a similar correction to be applied to our case, it would not substantially 
change the conclusions drawn from the results tables. 
 
vii The small firms group corresponds to the firm size category 1 to 200 employees. However, the CBI data 
source underrepresents very small firms (<10 employees) and start-ups. Given the upper size limit, they may 
also contain what would be regarded in other work as medium-sized firms. The large firms correspond to the 
size category 500-5000 employees. We omit the largest firm category because there are few such firms and 
the intermediate size is not reported as the results are uninformative and interpretable as a mixture of the 
small and large results. 
 
viii  Although the testing across equations is not a prime issue in this paper, we can also carry out a direct test, 
as a first approximation, by ignoring the covariance between the estimated coefficients as might be justified in 
our case for the financial constraint where the pattern of results between the two groups seems substantially 
different. We performed this test for the financial coefficients in Table 3. Calculated in this way, the t-ratios for 
these coefficient differences confirm significance in difference at up to 0.01%. 
  
ix Discussion of non-financial factors affecting investment, including corporate governance, may be found in 
Williamson et al (ed. 2013), Driver and Temple (2014), and Driver and Thompson (eds 2018). 
 
x These findings may be specific to the UK context where firms are served by large inter-connected banks with 
little relational banking provision. Clearly the institutional features of the banking system in different countries 
will have affected the pattern of lending both in the run up to the crisis and afterwards (Bayoumi 2017). 
                                                          
